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CHINA IN THEORY
THE ORIENTALIST PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY
Daniel Vukovich
If one wanted to raise again the idea that the superstructure fol-
lows the base, then China—or more accurately, Western obsessions
with the perceived threats and achievements of the Peoples Repub-
lic—would seem to be an ideal case. But the omnipresence of “China”
in the media and in economic circles has only recently been matched
by its place in academic, intellectual production. That is, while an
empiricist China Studies has proceeded as though its cold war assump-
tions needed no revision, continuing to produce Sinological analyses
of what is wrong with the PRC, “China” has become a rather new
object of interest in Western theoretical circles. It is this latter devel-
opment that will preoccupy me below—the place of “China” in human-
ities theories of globalization as well as in cross-cultural studies of
China and the West.
Although little of the work in cultural theory that speaks the
country’s name is explicitly about China, it assumes a certain type of
knowledge about the area. It addresses a “real” China in the form of
a totalitarian state it conWdently knows. This received knowledge con-
solidates its arguments by ostensibly making them more complex and
cosmopolitan as opposed to narrowly Euro-American. For all their
heterodoxy in terms of “pure” theory, their outlook on China is one
shared by the media and mainstream Area Studies. Just as the latter
need interrogation, so too does cultural studies work to the degree
that it adopts the positional superiority of the theorist over and against
the possible epistemological challenges presented by the foreign
“area.” My attempt is to critique this particular production of truth
about China and to offer another way of looking at intellectual labor
and theory in the current conjuncture. Above all, it is the enlisting of
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received images such as the events of 1989 in Tiananmen Square that
suggest a certain new economism of theory—if “economism” can be
used for a mode of argument that resists considering (or informing
oneself about) materialities on the ground and that tends toward an
increasing abstraction as though abstraction alone were the proper
arena of truth.
These trends within knowledge production stem from the expan-
sion of global exchange within the academy and intellectual life. At
the risk of sounding vulgar (to use a word often applied to unap-
proved types of political analysis), it is as if the knowledge about China
that is produced in the West has to be as abstract and, in short, as
commodiWed as the other products of labor circulating between China
and its business partners. The homology between what passes for
knowledge about China today, on the one hand, and the workings of
abstraction and the value-form in capitalist exchange, on the other
hand, undergirds my comments below. My point is not simply to
debunk such China references; nor is it to undo everything the theo-
rists have to say. I seek to show that their premises regarding China
are unfounded and that this falseness is symptomatic of something
greater, which the second half of the essay on Alfred Sohn-Rethel and
intellectual labor will explore.
“CHINA” IN THEORY
In the concluding chapter of The Coming Community Giorgio Agamben
turns to Tiananmen in 1989 to demonstrate the actuality and world-
liness of the new global situation and of his chief concept in the book:
“whatever singularity” (1993, 84).1 The latter refers to a community
without “determinate contents,” without a deWning essence or iden-
tity, without “conditions of belonging” and beyond any national
ascription. Agamben’s project here is to Wnd an ethics that can ground
community, but one not based on ideology or, apparently, history. As
with his later work, Agamben attempts to privilege ethics over poli-
tics, expressing a refusal of national belonging and the salience of the
nation-state that clearly is shared somewhat later by Hardt and Negri’s
work. This non-identitarian community of what he calls “the Chinese
May” is, in his opinion, a new development to the extent that it was
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not a struggle for the “control or conquest of the State,” but stood
opposed to it as the “non-State” (85). This last is a term he equates,
appositionally, to nothing less than “humanity” itself. It is this lack of
an identity and belonging that the state—qua state—found most intol-
erable in the protestors’ actions, and it is this that it was attempting
to suppress. In later work Agamben again Xeetingly returns to Tianan -
men to make much the same argument, speaking cryptically and omi-
nously: “the tanks will appear again” (2000, 89; cited in Power, n.41).
Right off, however, we should note a discrepancy between the
“China” of the U.S.-West and the “China” within the mainland. Tian -
anmen remains the most emblematic event of post-Mao China from
the point of view of those living outside the People’s Republic. In part
due to state censorship, 1989—while hardly unknown—has nowhere
near the iconic status within China as it does outside. For better and
for worse, it is simply not the SiniWed analog of, say, the Prague Spring,
and within China the anonymous Tank Man is not, as he is for Time
magazine, one of the last century’s greatest heroes. My point here is
not to downplay the signiWcance of Tiananmen in an absolute sense,
nor of course to excuse Deng Xiaoping et alia from their criminal vio-
lence. It is, though, to mark the difference between an inside and an
outside and to mark the Western Wxation on an event that serves as
the key event of post-Mao China and the emblem of China’s perWdy in
an era when it “threatens” the U.S.-West’s political-economic domi-
nance. But while the choice of Tiananmen is itself signiWcant here, the
larger issue is the content of what Agamben and other theorists have
to say. And striking in this regard is very simply the matter of histor-
ical accuracy and, by extension, of knowledge.
Whatever the merits of Agamben’s sentiments, he is uninformed
when he claims that the only concrete demand of the movement was
the rehabilitation of the recently deceased, liberal general secretary
Hu Yaobang. Historians of the event concur that the student move-
ment as a whole was actually patriotic (indeed, the youth insisted on
this) and wanted above all recognition by the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP)—which it by and large did not oppose. Their demands
included treatment as an equal, valued partner in carrying out state
policies of modernization and reform. Within China Studies, the con-
sensus laments these characteristics, seeing in them the lack of a more
Western, proceduralist understanding of democracy and civil society,
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and identifying this lack as the reason for the movement’s failure. So
too the notion that this “community” lacked a representable identity
would come as news to the participants, or to readers of Zhao Dingxin’s
history of the movement, which thickly describes the turbulent and
fractious jockeying for personal and ideological control within the
leadership.2
This internal struggle within the student movement and their
external conXicts with the party and with workers’ groups on the
square were certainly about identity and recognition as much as about
ideology, policy, and social justice. Or in other words, Tiananmen
contained the inevitable mix of factors in a protest movement and a
struggle over representation in its political and subjective dimensions.
The students’ demands for the reversal of the April 26 People’s Daily
editorial condemning them as unpatriotic, for ofWcial dialogues with
CCP leaders, and for the dismissal of Premier Li Peng (who called for
martial law) have to be seen as in part a struggle over identity.3 So too
for the workers’ calls to have the Wnances of Deng Xiaoping and oth-
ers publicized, and for their own big-character posters that (contra
Agamben) made speciWc demands for, say, the right to form their own
unions and get paid, and that moreover proclaimed themselves as the
vanguard of the nation and revolution.4 Such fundamental aspects of
the protest movement Wnd no space within Agamben’s analysis of the
Chinese March-to-June event, and his positing of a communal “sin-
gularity” beyond identity and against the state is simply asserted as
a romantic obviousness. It is just something that is known, without
need for research and elaboration.
The Tiananmen events, then, here become an Xoating signiWer,
whose only concrete meaning is precisely its rhetorical function as
the historical “proof ” of Agamben’s conceptual work: that we are be -
yond the nation and that traditional forms of politics, ethics, iden-
tity, and collective struggles are anachronistic, but we are witnessing,
mes sianically, the birth of singularities and new forms of global com-
munity. In other words, Agamben’s use of China—and it is worth
repeating that he concludes his study with Tiananmen, one of the few
speciWc, contemporary examples in his text—must be seen not as a
measured analysis of the actual events but as of a piece with the popu -
lar images of Tiananmen, 1989: the Tank Man, the Goddess of Democracy
statue, the spontaneous explosion of common humanity underneath
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the visible foreignness of China, and so forth. For Agamben, as for
Hardt and Negri below, this is Tiananmen as spectacle. As Rey Chow
once put it: China is that thing that “facilitates the production of 
surplus-value in the politics of knowledge-as-commodity”: “it be -
comes . . . the ‘Other’ onto which the unthinkable is projected” (87).
In a different but equally problematic register, the great majority of
China Studies scholarship still codes the protest movement as the birth
and then termination of a (bourgeois) “civil society” that stands
opposed to the state and that is disconnected from class.5
Far closer to the events would be to read the crackdown as a 
panicked response to the general strike emerging in Beijing due to 
the activities of the workers more than to the students and intellec-
tuals that the West Wxates on. The movement and the workers’ over-
whelming presence in it are best seen as a class-based response to the
unemployment and “structural adjustments” of a formerly planned,
socialist welfare system. From a Marxist or workers’ perspective, 1989
was a response to an increasing political authoritarianism linked to
the state’s abdication of social welfare and a rising neoliberalism.6 Hence
the absence of an antistate position but rather demands for inclusion
by students and workers. As for the civil society interpretation, or
Agamben’s similar but more profound antistate one, Wang Hui has
argued against both on the grounds that in China the public sphere
has for a long time existed “within the state’s space” and so cannot be
a “natural deterrent” to state power (179–80). Wang consistently de -
fends the capacity and necessity of the nation-state, and socialist ide-
ology, to foster social justice in China. His own complex reading of
the Tiananmen movement—couched in neutral prose—argues that its
rise and fall was ultimately about the restoration of “links among mar-
ket mechanisms that had begun to fail” in the late 1980s and that had
created the social dislocations and discontent behind the protests (117).
In the event, 1989 marked the coming onslaught of neoliberalism and
the eventual weakening of the state.
Hardt and Negri’s Empire is a similar text in both its Zeitgeist-
style and its case for nothing less than a new communist manifesto
for the global communities or “multitudes.” Hardt and Negri revise
the metaphysically anthropological mode of Agamben’s The Coming
Community by emphasizing “immaterial labor” and post-Fordism and
declaring that the new global community has already arrived. But they
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share with Agamben a highly challenged use of China. Here, too,
Tiananmen presents itself in unexpected places, again turning on what
the movement lacked. This struggle, like the Palestinian Intifada of 1989
and the Zapatista uprising to which it is equated, is characterized
above all by its “incommunicability,” its “failure” to communicate at
both a “local level” and to other, global struggles (Hardt and Negri,
54). Hardt and Negri do not see this as a problem as much as a sign
of the times: that in the age of empire, what such struggles lack in
communicability and duration, they make up for in “intensity” and
point to a new or future type of communication based “not on resem-
blances but . . . differences”: “a communication of singularities” (57).
And yet, the question of who is communicating what to whom goes
begging. This is also assuming, as one must with Agamben, that a
crypto-sublime singularity can be communicated at all. But despite
its alleged ephemerality and inability to “communicate” locally or
globally, Tiananmen nonetheless leaps “vertically,” “touches” “the
global level,” and “attacks . . . Empire” (55, 57). It is very odd to hear
that a mass movement that spread across several provinces and rapidly
mobilized much of Beijing’s population, not least through big-character
posters, handbills, and pirate broadcasts, was not communicating any -
thing—even to the Chinese (see, e.g., Unger). I would submit that, just
as the Mao period is made equivalent to Soviet Russia, the Tiananmen
reference is simply a convenient vehicle—a crucial “proof ” and exem-
plum—to show the truth of “empire.” Precisely because the text seeks
to convince us that the new empire, its multitudes, and their common
resistances do actually exist and form a whole, it is crucial to ask what
such struggles as Tiananmen, the Intifada, and so on have in common.
But Tiananmen, invoked in Deleuzian language, is something that we
are just supposed to know. “China” is ready-made to Wt the theory in
a seamless way.
This is an assimilating logic of equivalence at work in their text,
indicative of an abstract, capital logic of value within intellectual labor.
For Marx as for Sohn-Rethel, equivalence is of one piece with the
logic of capital and abstraction itself, and it grows in force and scale
with the universalization of exchange and the separation of intellec-
tual and manual labor (see also Jameson). This logic is again shown
when the authors suggest a “parallel” between the twin “bureaucratic
dictatorships” of China and Russia, and that as with the case of Russian
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culture during the last throes of the USSR, the “Chinese proletariat”
likewise showed “fabulous creativity” in the 1980s during the Cul-
tural Fever “movement” (Hardt and Negri, 278, 460 n.29). I leave to one
side the description of elite Chinese intellectuals and artists as prole-
tarians and analogs to Russian glasnost artists. While one of the mer-
its of Empire is its avowedly synthesizing method, touching on any
number of theoretical currents, it is nonetheless marred by an assim-
ilation of foreign contexts and by a lack of mediation that is rooted in
the antidialectical sources of their work. Theoretical practice here
means yoking together facts, images, or events from around the globe
into a contemporary theoretical framework that is recognizably West-
ern in provenance.
What is striking is the cursory gloss of the challenges to histori-
cism by like-minded poststructuralist/postcolonial critics, or of the
challenges to orientalist historiography by, say, Edward Said or Andre
Gunder Frank. If in their major programs of research Said and Frank
threw down major challenges to how we have written the history of
the Other, then this is a call that, in the current conjuncture, most pro-
ducers of knowledge and new theory simply do not hear. Empire’s
mode of assimilation and lack of response to others’ major challenges
indexes material transformations within intellectual labor and the
larger economy. These traits reveal an increase in the force of abstrac-
tion within thought under contemporary capitalism, a development
that goes hand in hand with the expansion of the commodity relation
into more and more spheres of intellectual life. Of this, more later in
the second part of this essay. But to the point right now: Empire’s in -
ability to engage with concrete situations and political events is cru-
cial for establishing its chain of equivalence between Soviet Russia,
1980s China, the Intifada, and so on, and for producing the concept of
a decentered but global empire literally encompassing everything.
Their concept of empire is as Zhang Xudong has argued, a “norma-
tive” one grounded by “a voluntarist and ahistorical Left vision of
global utopia” and not the empirically true one they claim (2004, 47).
To which we can also add that China, be it of the Great Leap (1958–61)
or the 1980s, can really make no difference in this analysis. Given this
type of abstraction, Chinese communes and Chinese capitalism are
more or less the same, as is Chiapas.
In recent writings on totalitarianism, Lenin, and the state of the
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“global Left,” Žižek (to take a rather different wing of cultural theory)
displays a similar use of China. The reference is most often to the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–76), which reduces to the stereotype of en -
tranced “Red Guardists ecstatically destroying old historical monu-
ments . . . desecrating old paintings,” and to Mao’s emperor-like
“extreme” pursuit of “full personal power,” after which he quickly
restores order (2001b). For Žižek, what this image proves, against the
Chairman and Stalin (whom he thoughtlessly equates), is the proper
autonomy of the “sphere of material production”; if the latter is sub-
ordinated to “the terrain of political battle or logic,” it can only result
in “terror” (2001a, 139). Totalitarianism, in this view, is the result of
the primacy of the political over the economic, and not the other way
around (as Hannah Arendt would have it). Žižek thus uses China to
counter the misuse of totalitarianism as a politically quietist notion
devoid of economic mediation. Yet the more salient, useful points about
this slipshod concept are not broached: that in the case of China,
where genuinely popular Maoist mobilizations were as common as
conXicts within the party and society, the attribution of totalitarian-
ism implies “brainwashing” and oriental-despotic control of a peren-
nially passive populace. It is not a critical concept so much as part of
colonial discourse.7 That China was and is totalitarian, that its popu-
lace is largely quiet, passively suffering, and state controlled even
when it is rebelling, is a standard part of orientalist common sense and
Area Studies discourse. But it is contradicted by, for example, China’s
long history of peasant rebellions, the “mass democracy” of the Cul-
tural Revolution, the new regime’s widely felt legitimacy through the
early 1970s at least, and the skyrocketing of mass incidents since the
1980s.8
What we have here, then, is not an interrogation of Arendt and
others or of China but a dressed-up “vulgar” Marxism that emphasizes
the primacy of the productive forces over the relations of production.
Žižek thus shares this belief with Deng Xiaoping and post-Stalinist
Marxists. As it was for them, it remains a strongly depoliticizing type
of rationality that is just as quietist as “totalitarianism.” Whatever else
one might say of his critique of Arendt, the point here is that his uses
of China have little to do with what the Cultural Revolution was really
like. Thus, his notion that Mao was only after full personal power is
belied by the fact that by 1967 Mao already re-secured that. This leaves
CHINA IN THEORY 155
07 Vukovich_CC #76  8/21/2010  8:11 AM  Page 155
Žižek with nine-tenths of the complex era to account for. This is indeed
Mao as despot and not historical Wgure, thinker, or rational political
leader. It comes as no surprise then that Žižek (2007) can cite a pulp-
orientalist biography as an authoritative text on the Great Leap For-
ward and Mao’s thought.9 It must also be said that when he writes on
the Cultural Revolution as a hopeless entanglement of politics and
economics (the “terror” of politics in command of production) he re -
produces a key element of colonial discourse. As George Steinmetz
has noted (22–23), characterizing premodern and socialist societies
as muddled, confused, and backward in this way—as opposed to the
rationally differentiated spheres of the West—has long been a staple
of orientalist thought.
Now my point here is not just that Žižek would beneWt from read-
ing, say, Gao Mobo (1999, 2008), Chris Bramall, or Han Dongping on
the socioeconomic achievements of the Cultural Revolution, or Wang
Zheng and others’ afWrmative, feminist analyses of growing up dur-
ing the Mao era. Nor that Žižek’s parallel between Mao dissolving the
Shanghai Commune and Lacan’s closing his École Freudienne is less
clever than Xippant (and all wrong chronologically). The point is that
such intellectual labor would involve a research paradigm beyond
theoretical “application” to casually posited “facts” about China. It
would be of a different type than that embarked upon by Žižek or the
others examined here, particularly when they write about the non-
Western world. Surely, then, there could be no better illustration of
the use of theory as a labor-saving operation. The abstract form of the
China knowledge reXected in such work indexes not just the orien-
talist common sense about China at work in the world, but again a
certain economism. The use of China as something already known
and ready-to-hand saves time. But at what cost to the concrete history
of China?
The simpler, “vulgar” question of reading bears scrutiny. What is
striking in the positions adopted by heterodox thinkers is that even in
the sphere of left cultural theory, many of our theorists content them-
selves with received notions about China taken largely from the West-
ern media. Ironically, we need not be limited to such knowledge due
to Chinese state censorship, for there is now a signiWcant body of work
that offers alternative, complex knowledge of the PRC. There is no
evidence at all, in fact, that radical theory has read or digested the
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views of their counterparts in China or abroad, whose own hetero-
doxy would throw new light on the problem of an imputed totalitar-
ianism and the “known” realities of the PRC. Wang Zheng, for instance,
has argued that the quasi-feminist, Maoist discourse of gender neutral-
ity—promulgated by the state—enabled young women to self-identify
as “revolutionary youth” and “communist successors,” to grow up
free from patriarchal kinship obligations, and to be largely unaware
of being “women” (see esp. Wang Zheng 51–52). Han and Gao (1999)
offer us rich studies of the remarkable increases in rural welfare, edu-
cation, health care, and political participation during the Cultural Rev-
olution, as well as incisive critiques of elite histories of post-1949 China
within and outside the mainland. These are complemented by Wang
Hui’s (116–37) theoretical arguments against the Eurocentrism of the
antistate, beyond-the-nation position of Western theory and for more,
not less state intervention into the free market.
None of this work is in the true of China Studies or Sinological-
orientalism. It represents another China that is more complex than tele-
visual images of 1989 and the common sense about post-1949 China.
The latter uses of China speak to an essentially cold war if not colo-
nial perspective on the PRC. Gao, Wang Hui, and others—for all their
differences—show us a China that for all its turmoil and failures
achieved much in terms of human welfare and egalitarianism and was,
perhaps until 1989 itself, a revolutionary society in transition toward
another order of things. My point here is that the scholarship and
counterfactuals evoked here (by no means an exhaustive account) call
into question the heedless yet crucial uses of China in the above works.
Moreover, these texts and alternative truths are available in English.
Thus, the failure of theorists to engage this material, to “labor” ade-
quately, cannot be placed at the door of a real but in this case limited
Chinese censorship. The root of this problem then must lie somewhere
else; not in personal failing but in the marked tendency toward abstrac-
tion within theory.
I will return below to questions of economism and intellectual
labor, and why such uses of China take the abstract form that they do.
But to further my case for the orientalist use of China in theory, I want
to turn to the generic poststructuralism in texts that examine the
question of how China has been written in foreign and native litera-
ture alike. Here the new turn is called “Sinography”: “the study not
CHINA IN THEORY 157
07 Vukovich_CC #76  8/21/2010  8:11 AM  Page 157
simply of how China is written about, but the ways in which that writ-
ing constitutes itself simultaneously as a form of writing and a form of
Chineseness” (Hayot, 87).10 But whereas Derrida targeted Western
logocentrism, “Sinography” is focused on the process of graphesis or
writing as such, and is in fact aimed against critique of the West and
the marking of misrepresentation. It eschews evaluation, judgment,
and criticism on the basis of what counts as the truth. That type of
work—the work of the negative—in Eric Hayot’s view can only be
“moralistic,” “debunking,” and can only falsely grant to China or the
West “an ontological stability” that neither has (xiv, 180–81). Like Haun
Saussy he is at pains to announce that the West has no such stability
and is just as constructed and changing at different moments and in
different texts as is China (Hayot, xii–xiii, 180–81; Saussy, 853–54, 885
n.14). While valid at a formal level of the signiWer, this claim misses
the point of Marxist-inspired work on globalization: the world remains
structured neocolonially by a core/periphery division centered on
the West and First World, which exercises economic and political, if
not cultural hegemony over “the Rest.” Indeed, Saussy will claim that
the phrase “the West and the Rest” is “mythology” (182). What ex -
plains this perspective, aside from the substitution of ethics for poli-
tics à la Agamben, is a strident poststructuralism that presents itself
as more “complex” and ethically sensitive than postcolonial or other
critiques. It is as if facts, beliefs, or identities, accessible only through
language, do not acquire material force and have real effects in the
world; as if all constructions of China are the same.
Thus, despite the caveat that Sinography will proceed “without
abandoning the question of reference altogether,” it indeed abandons
this, save for a few potshots at Maoist or “nationalist” intellectuals
and the party-state (“the shadow of realpolitikal China”) (Hayot, 182).
(Such shots further indicate that the eschewal of reference allows
Sinography and other poststructuralist “new” readings of China to
conceal their essentially cold war political dimensions.) All forms of
knowledge—of writing China—are generally equivalent, as they are all
“graphesis” (Hayot, 185). Here, China ceases to exist outside of con-
structions, dreams, or writings of “China.” For a theoretical turn that
aims to be more sophisticated than Saidian critique, we are left with
a China—and Sino–West encounter—that is an abstract thought ex -
periment. This is preordained in the original transformation of the
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topic of Western understandings of China into an act of generic cross-
cultural reading. The problem arises in part with Hayot’s positioning
of China as only a space in Eurasia with a “more or less continuous
history of being conceived as a political identity”; from this standpoint,
the study of representations of China can only be an exercise in “intel-
lectual history and cross-cultural reading” in general (Hayot, ix, my
emphasis). As is often the case with strict “social constructionist”
modes of criticism, the only reality is that of perception and form. My
point here is not just that there is a difference between such construc-
tions of reality and reality itself. That, as Roy Bhaskar reminds us 
is the epistemic fallacy: mistaking our knowledge of reality for the
“thing,” reality, itself (111–12, 397). It is also that “Sinography” cannot
help us discern what is being constructed. It cannot answer or even
pose questions like, Why is one “graphing” of China more or less
valuable than another? Why do Sinography other than to show that
representations of China and Chineseness are “written”? There is
here no dialectic, process, or relay between an actual event and our
textualized knowledge of it.
In the end we are presented with a closed system of discourse
that like orientalism itself is only self-referential: “Whatever distinc-
tion exists between the West and ‘China.’ . . . nonetheless reveals itself
. . . to be caught up in the ephemerality of self-recognition” (Hayot,
188). This echoes Saussy’s claim against critique and for theory as
self-referential therapy: “Have we been missing something all these
centuries, so that we take a work of critique to be the archetypal pro-
ject of logical construction? Or is the difference (between philosophy
as foundation and philosophy as therapy) merely illusory?” (189–90).
There is indeed a long view of History here, resulting in a condition
that can no longer say what China or “China” refer to, beyond a cer-
tain set of signiWers that refer back only to the text in question. This is
indeed a postmodernism—a triumphalistic textuality reminiscent of
the Modern Language Association of the late 1980s—writ large. The
positional superiority of the Sinographer is as strong here as in Agam -
ben and the rest. It is assumed that this “graphing” framework Wts
China seamlessly, and virtually all writings of China at any point 
in time. Thus, Saussy can reach back to Mateo Ricci, the sixteenth-
century Italian missionary as easily as to journalist Edgar Snow (1905–
72), alleged Chinese nationalists, or Derrida, because he is unimpeded
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by contextualization. Note that this type of analysis departs from Said’s
own sweeping history. Orientalism mapped changes within a discur-
sive structure and rooted these within a larger history of contact and
colonialism. The postmodern template of Sinography is also notable
for its non-engagement with the large body of literature from China
on postmodernism (as theory and as epoch) and its relationship to
the mainland, a subject of intense debate since the late 1980s (for an
overview, see Dirlik and Zhang, and Liu and Tang).11 We can thus say
of these texts directed against postcolonialism and for misrepresenta-
tion what Brennan has said of Rey Chow’s deconstruction of the “myth
of origins” and “Chineseness”: that they do not deconstruct reference
so much as “efface” it; and having done this, “there is no outer tribu -
nal to compare China against the West’s ‘translation’ of it” (Brennan,
54). This is not to appeal to an unmediated reality but to a mediated
one, to the context and constitutive outside of interpretation and cul-
tural translation. In the case of China this must be informed by the
antagonisms and epistemological challenges—such as orientalism—
that have subtended the China–West relationship for, say, a good three
hundred years. Without such ground not just critique but understand-
ing is impossible. This tribunal will inevitably have to substantially
address and not dismiss the complex matters of misrepresentation
and judgment.
The knowledge of China and cross-cultural relations produced
by Sinography is thus not just self-referential but—notwithstanding
its local detail about, say, Pound’s poetry or Tel Quel’s polemics—as
abstract as the references to China in the texts above. So, too, one has
to again note the economism: what is announced is not a research pro-
ject into China–West relations but a yoking together of all such en -
counters into a common, generic act of writing in and of itself, one
that is somehow more ethical than and beyond critique.
REAL ABSTRACTION AND THE RISE OF “CHINA” 
IN WESTERN MINDS
Having examined some uses of “China” in theory we are in a better
position to reXect on their consequences for how we understand knowl-
edge production today. From here it is worth exploring why, after the
DANIEL VUKOVICH160
07 Vukovich_CC #76  8/21/2010  8:11 AM  Page 160
rise of postcolonial studies and the “theoretical turn” in the humani-
ties, such knowledge of China persists and arguably increases in vol-
ume. The answer is that Sinological-orientalism exists because it can.
By this I mean several things. The most basic is that China Studies—
and the knowledge of China produced in other Welds—has gone
through neither a process of decolonization nor what Chen Kuan-Hsing
calls the de–cold war. It is hard to imagine, by way of comparison, major
heterodox, theoretical texts that comfortably invoke large, sweeping
generalizations and falsehoods about, say, India or Mexico. What ex -
plains this sanctioned ignorance in regard to China and not, to the
same extent, to South Asia?
One reason is the relative success of postcolonial theory that is
rooted in the areas of South Asia and Africa in particular, but also in
that great, “Middle Eastern” text by Said from 1978. By saying this I
hardly mean to imply that postcolonial studies is adequate to the 
critique of colonialism and capitalist modernity; but it has been insti-
tutionalized and has had effects. These places, through the work of
scholars working over a long period of time in the U.S./Western acad-
emy, have produced knowledge that to a limited but palpable extent
does challenge colonial thinking. Critical China scholarship by con-
trast enters the scene of knowledge production only recently—admit-
tedly in the time of post-Mao China and greater academic exchanges.
It also enters with a more fraught, charged, and orientalized geopolit -
ical relationship with the U.S.-West and Area Studies. It is postcolonial
work, as well as Marxist scholarship on colonialism and globalization
that is elided in China Studies and, with the partial exception of Hardt
and Negri, in the work examined here. So too the West’s cold war tri-
umphalism and China’s massive “reforms”—including an open season for
Sinological knowledge production—have made alternative, critical truths
about China harder to apprehend. Since the 1980s, in other words,
China has been more or less an anything-goes free-for-all for the pro-
duction of knowledge and an attendant “archive,” including the cre-
ation of, for example, famine statistics, tell-it-all memoirs, anecdotes
and anonymous interviews, isolated county annals, and so on. There
is an important paradox here: while the mainland is more or less an
open Weld, so to speak, this does not mean that the resultant knowl-
edge and information is any less interested and worldly than before.
And if what I am arguing—in more detail below—about the pressures
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of economism and abstraction within intellectual labor obtains, then
despite its concrete detail at one level this “new” China knowledge is
much more problematic and abstracted—removed from the great polit-
ical and social complexities of China—than assumed.
One must also note the virtual disappearance of an emergent,
leftist tradition of U.S. China Studies scholarship from the late1960s
and mid-1970s that was based in the former Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars. As a social scientiWc Area Studies formation it seems
to have lacked the theoretical armor and self-reXexivity to respond to
the changes within China and the rightward-drift of intellectual polit-
ical culture there and at home. I tend to locate this shift in an uninter -
rogated humanism that was shocked to the core by the later, post-Mao
realization that post-liberation China was indeed at times seriously
violent, authoritarian, chaotic, and not a dinner party. Given the re -
grettable absence of that generation’s self-reXection on such issues, 
it is hard to say. But clearly, the leftist tradition abdicated, and you
would be hard pressed to Wnd leftist or recognizably Marxist work on
China in any of the main journals of the Weld or in its Xagship Asian
Studies presses.12 For one thing, the form of scholarship has changed.
Area Studies experts aspire to a professionalized “objectivity” and
anti-theoretical empiricism, even while explicitly or surreptitiously
endorsing the PRC’s turn toward capitalist “reform” and its own de-
MaoiWcation and denigration of the post-1949 revolutions within the
revolution.13
Another factor behind the “new” orientalism are the changes in
the long relationship between the Chinese revolution and Western
theory, especially on the left. As Robert Young has noted, “Maoist the-
ory became highly inXuential among radical left intellectuals in the
1960s. . . . The degree to which French poststructuralism . . . involved
what amounted to a Maoist retheorization of European political and
cultural theory, as well as it complex connection to Indian postcolo-
nialism, which has also been deeply affected by Maoism, remain as
yet unexplored” (187). This is to say, the Chinese revolution inspired
a good deal of heterodox theory—to say nothing of actually existing
Maoist movements across the Third World. Whatever else we might
say of such appropriations—think of the Black Panthers, or the early
Subaltern Studies historians like Ranajit Guha—clearly China proved
an enabling, creative, and productive space for noteworthy intellectual
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and political efforts. What we have now is something quite different,
where the poststructuralist importation into China Studies comes in
a strongly depoliticized form and where, in general theoretical cir-
cles, China serves as negative example if not mere spectacle. Surely
what lies behind this is in part the tides of depoliticization sweeping
the globe as well as what Fredric Jameson once referred to as the wide-
spread paralysis of the Western social imaginary. But it is hard not to
hear a strong note of disillusionment on the part of the Western left
in regard to the rise of a spectacularly successful and spectacularly
capitalist post-Mao China. That rise, actually and tragically built on
the infrastructure and human capital produced in the Mao years, has
its roots in the 1970s. Those are also the roots of our contemporary,
“post-Fordist,” and Xexible capitalism.
But we must broach another dimension of the persistence of 
Sinological-orientalism. Not least because there is, again, scholarship
and criticism about China that is not orientalist and dominative, and
that counters cold war–era Sinology.14 But this type of work has to date
made little impact on intellectual trends and the abstraction of China
in texts like the ones here (nor indeed on China Studies). Why this is
so has to do, in the last instance, with the larger China–West relation-
ship, particularly with the PRC’s emergence within global capitalism.
It has not escaped anyone’s attention that the relationship between
China and the world is overwhelmingly an economic one. Yet no one
has examined the implications of this for the knowledge of China that
is produced in the world. This rise of China and its economy must have
its effects on intellectual production. This includes, I will now argue, an
effect on the form of the labor of the critic who uses China as an ex -
ample of something else (of the truth of postmodernism, the multi-
tudes, and so on). Whereas in the recent past one would not have had
to reference China without a speciWc, direct interest in the revolution
or culture, today it is difWcult to avoid it. It simply must be referred to
by the critic at large. As if the West must now respond to China—a
remarkable reversal of the classic model of Sinology whereby China
must respond to “us.”
Not that there is anything wrong with that: the issue is what one
says and how one approaches “China,” by way of what previously
accumulated “knowledge” and one’s relationship to that area in the
center of Asia that—pace “Sinography”—exists as a political, economic,
CHINA IN THEORY 163
07 Vukovich_CC #76  8/21/2010  8:11 AM  Page 163
cultural, and not merely conceptual entity. Those truths are often ori-
entalist and ultimately abstract and do not index China so much as
something else. This something else is for one thing the economism
underlying the China references. By economism here I mean some-
thing more than the professional imperative to produce texts that
include “China” and that now “see” it due to its rise. Yet even this
speaks to an economic relationship worth noting despite or rather
because of its vulgarity: it is not that we now know China better, but
that the global economic footprint of China is too large not to enter
our consciousness and to produce more “China references.” But in
addition, by economism I refer to the force of capitalist exchange: of
the real abstraction underlying thought within capitalism. For Marx
as for Sohn-Rethel, real abstraction derives from the commodity form.
Or more accurately, the genesis of real abstraction lies in the force of
capitalist exchange, in the process of value that unleashes a calculat-
ing, quantitative rationality into the culture and society of capitalism.
Much of our understanding of the culture of capitalism derives
from the Marxist theory of the commodity form as the triumph of
exchange value (the money form) over use-value in production for
the market. The institutionalization of exchange not only represents
a negation of use-value—where this last signiWes experience and dif-
ference, not just “utility”—but the type of thought that makes the
incommensurable comparable (see also Jameson). This theme remains
indispensable, not least with a homogenizing globalization in full
force. But to develop the connection between intellectual labor and
real abstraction we need to take a step back to the work of Marx and
Sohn-Rethel and what makes this force real. To begin with, abstraction
is much more than a mental generalization that organically springs
forth from the head. It is real in that it is historical and social: “ The
commodity or value abstraction revealed in [Marx’s] analysis must
be viewed as a real abstraction resulting from spatio-temporal activ-
ity” (Sohn-Rethel, 20, cited in Toscano, 281). This activity is not just
the historical evolution of the money form of value but also the mate-
rial processes by which labor power—deWned by Marx as the “living
personality” of the human being, “the living, form giving Wre . . . the
transitoriness of things, their temporality [and] their formation by liv-
ing time”—becomes abstract labor (Marx 1977, 270; 1973, 361). Put
another way, labor power—that is, laborers—undergo a social process
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of abstraction; all forms, all concrete manifestations of labor power
are rendered the same, reduced to the same substance. Like “Sino-
graphies” and “Chinese facts” to orientalism, they are made generally
equivalent to abstract, homogenous labor. The positing of this abstract
sameness is therefore far from a solely mental operation.15
So too abstraction has its own roots, marked better by Marx than
Sohn-Rethel. Its genesis, as with capitalism as such, lies in the expro-
priation of peasants, in primitive accumulation and dispossession,
and in the theft of gold and silver from the Americas at the beginning
of modern colonialism. And here, too, China is of some signiWcance:
Andre Gunder Frank’s last work established the centrality of China
to this rise of Western or global capitalism, as it served as the great
buyer of silver stolen from the Americas, thence leading to Europe’s
massive capital accumulation (see the inimitable Frank). Real abstrac-
tion, then, as Alberto Toscano notes, is “to be discerned in the opera-
tions of capitalism rather than in an ideological preoccupation with
the concrete truth or hidden essence that the abstractions of capital
supposedly occlude” (282). Value and exchange are not simply meta -
phorical here, even if they are asked to do a lot of theoretical work.
Sohn-Rethel is far from, say, Georges Bataille or Derridean notions of
general economy. While Kantian and not Hegelian, he retains a notion
of totality and works within the traditions of historical materialism.
Thus, abstraction is rooted in the commodity form but also in pro-
duction and labor.
Sohn-Rethel contributes to this value theoretic by bringing the
multifaceted history of abstraction to bear on the development of intel-
lectual labor. Co-extensive with this history of the commodity relation
and the labor/capital dyad is the division between intellectual and
manual labor. His intervention is to recode what philosophy calls “the-
ory of knowledge” into a question of intellectual labor and its sepa-
ration from manual labor. The creation of intellectual labor is as much
the result of real abstraction as the labor/capital and use/exchange
value divisions; they are of whole cloth. His characterization of intel-
lectual labor allows us to return to the abstract form of theory and
China knowledge examined above, grounded now in our more ex -
pansive and “Chinese” moment of global capitalism. For Sohn-Rethel,
the real abstraction generated by commodity exchange transforms
intellectual labor. It transforms the very form and quality of thought
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under capitalism: “[W]hat deWnes the character of intellectual labour 
in its full-Xedged division from all manual labour is the use of non-
empirical form-abstractions which may be represented by nothing
other than non-empirical, ‘pure’ concepts” (66). It will help to recall
here that commodity exchange too is non-empirical in its erasure of
the conditions of labor (e.g., in the sweat shops of South China), of the
erasure of time that goes into surplus value extraction, and so on that
subtend such exchange. The pure and independent intellect of phi-
losophy, then, and the “fundamental forms of abstract thought (as
manifest in . . . the postulations of mathematics, or the constitution of
the Kantian transcendental subject) all originate with the commodity-
form” (Toscano, 280).
It is in this sense that Sohn-Rethel can answer his famous ques-
tion—“Can there be abstraction other than by thought?”—in the afWr-
mative (17). It is in this sense that he can demonstrate the centrality
of exchange and real abstraction—concomitant with the genesis of
classes in the modern, capitalist sense—to fundamental problems of
social, cultural, and philosophical analysis. In sum, “Sohn-Rethel
undertakes a veritable expropriation of abstract thought” (Toscano, 280).
Intellectual abstraction is not bad because abstract but dangerous be -
cause it is blind to the social processes that constitute “pure” thought.
While Sohn-Rethel’s work deserves further examination in its
own right, we should nonetheless be in a better position to see his rel-
evance to the problems of intellectual labor, if not directly to the ques-
tion of Sinological-orientalism and the impression of “China” on our
consciousness. Given the obvious relevance of his work to the expan-
sion of capitalism—which is to say his purchase on globalization—it
is striking that his great study remains out of print and largely unread.
One reason for this would be that much humanities work on global-
ization proceeds on the same poststructuralist grounds as before—
as if such theory automatically Wts a post–cold war era of neoliberal
development and a rising China.16 Sohn-Rethel’s breathtaking but
sweeping generalizations from antiquity onward must seem decid-
edly old-fashioned and modern/structuralist, as would his wrestling
with inordinately complicated philosophical (as opposed to “theoret-
ical”) problems. One such hindrance is more speciWcally the totalizing
nature of his argument, and his evident—that is, clear and forceful—
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claims to causality. For Sohn-Rethel the commodity abstraction is to 
be taken literally. His critique of epistemology and intellectual labor
turns in the last instance on economic determination (Sohn-Rethel,
20). My point, however, is not that this is a Xawless text, and the strik-
ingly conWdent world-historical sweep of his analysis certainly gives
one pause. At one point he reaches back to the “Bronze Age” as just
one moment of his historical narrative. But as beWts Sohn-Rethel’s
analysis of real abstraction, our best move is to think again about the
groundworks and historical changes in intellectual labor today, be -
neath the surface level of fashion.
To wit: perhaps what has changed is the increasing dominance 
of real abstraction within the forms of thought under contemporary
global capitalism. As the commodiWcation of everything proceeds
apace, incorporating even the “area” of China and the university, it
cannot but involve the increasing abstraction of intellectual labor. This
includes the practice of this labor, from the “quality management”
corporatization movement within academe and the erasure of tenure
to the growing “Xexibility” of academic labor. Recall as well that the
increasing time–space compression of global capitalism since the 1970s
also exerts its abstract force on thought: a faster, just-in-time produc-
tion of knowledge (see Harvey). This is to say, then, that this historical
shift is one important reason why work like Sohn-Rethel’s single study,
written and revised over a period of Wfty years, is nearly impossible
to imagine today. The paradigm of sustained historical and theoreti-
cal research beyond the straight-up application-mode of theory is in
decline. Under such pressures, theory can become a labor-saving oper-
ation. The complexity and speciWcity of China and its differences from
orientalist, cold war discourse have less space to register.
But if my argument for an increase in abstraction within intellec-
tual labor obtains at all, perhaps Sohn-Rethel’s work—his case for the
indispensability of the commodity relation in any analysis of thought—
will, after all, have its due. By establishing the relation between thought
and capitalism—and recalling again our current moment of capital—
his work usefully develops Marx’s insights into abstract “forms of
thought.” By these I have in mind how Marx characterized the con-
cepts of political economy: “ The categories of bourgeois economics
consist precisely of forms of this kind [of “universal equivalence”]. 
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They are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objec-
tive, for the relations of production belonging to this historically deter-
mined mode of production, i.e., commodity production” (1977, 169).
As he goes on to note, this social “validity” disappears when one en -
counters a different mode or space of production. For our purposes,
China—the actual one—would be such a space. While Marx’s concern
was not a critique of epistemology, his framing of these categories 
as only “socially valid” for a particular mode of production speaks 
to their formation by real abstraction. They are, like Sohn-Rethel’s
abstract forms of thought, both true and false; not empirical in a Wnal,
scientiWc sense but only valid for a certain context.17 (This dovetails
with Sohn-Rethel’s treatment of “Galilean-” and “bourgeois science”
[117–39].) These twin thinkers enable us to see, within intellectual
labor and knowledge production, the economic dimension of forms
and categories of thought. That is, we can better apprehend the work
of real abstraction within theory.
What I will now claim, then, is that as beWts a global capitalism
increasingly centered on and obsessed with the rising PRC, “China”
or “the real China” represents a placeholder for a “new” abstract
form of thought within intellectual labor and knowledge production.18
This is to say that the self-referential “China references” in the above
“heterodox” texts are abstract in an economic, Sohn-Rethelian sense.
They are non-empirical form-abstractions. They are real, orientalist
ones that index not China, or even a considered “China,” but the in -
creasingly economistic nature of intellectual labor and the increasing
presence of “China” within Western minds. In sum, then, I am point-
ing to a homology between the abstract form of the China in theory,
and the real, forceful abstraction at work in contemporary global cap-
italism and intellectual labor. This economism of theory points to the
expansion of capital within the realm of thought, and for which Sohn-
Rethel’s work knows a new lease on life. It is an encroachment with
orientalist “Chinese characteristics.” Unless the production of knowl-
edge about China changes—including within the mainland, itself sub-
ject to the same forces—the decolonization of China in theory will
remain an unWnished project. Such a change will not proceed from
further modernizing development and “quality management” within
academe, nor from theoretical-critique-as-application.
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Notes
1. “Whatever [qualunque],” as the translator notes, “refers precisely to that
which is neither particular nor general, neither individual nor generic” (Agamben
1993, 107).
2. See Zhao. For the tensions between the workers’ groups and the students,
see Lu.
3. See part 2 of Zhao and the documents in Oskenberg, especially the talks
between Li Peng and student leaders (269–81).
4. See the anonymous poster from a workers’ federation, “ Ten Questions
for the Chinese Communist Party,” reproduced in Lu, 184.
5. See Calhoun and the 1993 issue of Modern China on this topic (vol. 19, no.
2). For a detailed critique, see Vukovich, 2009.
6. See Meisner; Hinton. The right to strike—put into the constitution dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution—was eliminated in 1982.
7. See Pietz. This is also a central argument of my forthcoming book, China
and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C., and I am indebted to
Pietz.
8. For a history of such rebellions in modern China, see Gray. In 2005 the
number of ofWcial, recorded “mass incidents” was 87,000. There were 10,000
recorded in 1994.
9. The biography by Jung Chang and Fred Halliday has even been strongly
criticized by mainstream China studies. See the bulk of one 2006 issue of The
China Journal (no. 55) on this topic.
10. Original emphasis. Contra Freud and Lacan, Hayot repudiates depth
models and asks us what if “the latent and the manifest content [of dreams] might
be the same thing?” (87).
11. See as well the special issue of New Literary History called “Cultural Stud-
ies: China and the West” (28, no. 1, Winter 1997).
12. I thus disagree with Arif Dirlik, who in several ad hominem and ad fem-
inam essays laments the rise of postcolonial studies and theory since the early
1990s (even as he borrows its insights)—years after the decline of the Bulletin of
Concerned Asian Scholars—because they somehow negated an allegedly existing
yet wholly unspeciWed tradition of leftist (?) China scholarship. Dirlik’s own, dis-
tinguished work as an historian Wts conventional Area Studies. I understand him
to be defending and gatekeeping for that discipline.
13. See Cumings; Roberts. See also Barlow; Dutton. I attempt my own analy-
sis of the (ofWcial and expanded) China Weld in China and Orientalism. Space limi-
tations preclude further discussion here.
14. See Bramall; Gao (1999, 2008); Han; and Wang Zheng. In more theoreti-
cal registers, see Liu Kang; Zhang Xudong 2008. For earlier periods, see Hevia;
Karl; and Lydia Liu. This is a partial list but one must also note the relative
absence of “counter-disciplinary” works about the verboten Mao era.
15. My reading of abstract labor follows Colletti.
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16. See the discussion of “belated” theory in Behdad.
17. Etienne Balibar’s discussion of this passage is apposite (62–67).
18. I further examine this relationship between “China in theory” and capi-
tal in the concluding chapter of China and Orientalism.
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